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ANGEL V. BULLINGTON: TWILIGHT OF
DIVERSITY JURISDICTION?
L. W. FAmINHOLT, JR.*
I. INTRODUCTION
It is questionable whether Mr. Justice Brandeis, the author of the
majority opinion in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins,' could have fore-
seen the extent to which his pronouncement of a rule outlawing the
doctrine of Swift v. Tyson2 would be expanded in less than a decade.
From a case which merely decided that a federal court sitting in New
York may not, in a diversity case, apply a "federal common law,"3 the
doctrine has increased in scope to a degree where it threatents to permit
a state, at least indirectly, to prescribe, limit or extend the diversity
jurisdiction of the federal courts.
In Angel v. Bullington4 the Supreme Court by the use of an unhappy
admixture of the Erie rule and the res judicata concept reached this
point. Any further step in the same direction may well lead to a
greatly limited use of the diversity jurisdiction of federal courts.
II. PRocEDURE AND HOLDING
The plaintiff, Bullington, a citizen of Virginia, sold Virginia land
to the defendant, Angel, a citizen of North Carolina. In order to secure
the balance of the purchase price the defendant executed notes secured
by a deed of trust on the land. Upon default of one of the notes the
plaintiff, by authority of an acceleration clause in the deed, caused the
remaining notes to fall due and called upon the trustees to sell the land.
The sale was duly made in Virginia and the proceeds were applied to
the payment of the notes. Since these were insufficient to meet the notes
in full, the plaintiff sought to collect the deficiency. Action was first
brought against Angel in the Superior Court of Macon County, North
Carolina. The defendant demurred on the ground that a North Carolina
statute, enacted prior to the transaction in question, precluded recovery
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Maryland.
1304 U. S. 64, 58 Sup. Ct. 817, 82 L. Ed. 1188, 114 A. L. R. 1487 (1938).
' 16 Pet. 1. 10 L. Ed. 865 (U.S. 1842).
-'After categorically denying the existence of a "federal general common law,"
Mr. Justice -Brandeis, in an opinion handed down the same day, declared that
the question concerning water in an interstate stream was one "of federal common
law" upon which neither the statutes nor the decisions of either state can be con-
clusive. Hinderlider v. LaPlata Co., 304 U. S. 92, 110, 58 Sup. Ct. 803, 82 L. Ed.
1202 (1938).
'67 Sup. Ct. 657 (1947).
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of such a deficiency judgment.5 The statute relied upon, among other
things, provided:
"In all sales of real property by mortgagees and/or trustees
under powers of sale contained in any mortgage or deed of trust
hereafter executed, or where judgment or decree is given for the
foreclosure of any mortgage executed after the ratification of this
section to secure payment of the balance of the purchase price of
real property, the mortgagee or trustee or holder of the notes
secured by said mortgage or deed of trust shall not be entitled to
a deficiency judgment on account of said mortgage, deed of trust,
or obligation secured by the same."
The demurrer was overruled by the Superior Court but upon appeal
to the Supreme Court of North Carolina, the state court of last resort,
the lower court was reversed, the demurrer sustained and the action dis-
missed. 6 The plaintiff made no effort at this time toward review in the
Supreme Court of the United States of the adverse decision of the
North Carolina court.
Apparently under the impression that the legislature of North Caro-
lina by statute had closed the doors of the state courts, and the state
courts only, to his right of action, Bullington brought suit against the
defendant in the United States District Court for the Western District
of North Carolina.
Though the defendant pleaded in bar the judgment of the North
Carolina court, the District Court gave judgment for the plaintiff, Bul-
lington,7 and, upon appeal, the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit affirmed. 8 The Supreme Court granted certiorari0 for the pur-
pose of determining whether or not the North Carolina judgment pre-
cluded the right to recover on the same cause of action in the federal
court. It was held in a 6-3 decision, Mr. Justice Frankfurter delivering
the opinion, that the North Carolina judgment barred recovery in a
federal court in North Carolina on the same right of action.10
III. ANALYSIS OF CASE
A. Majority Reasoning.,
Mr. Justice Frankfurter's reasoning, resulting in this coioclusion,
may be outlined in the following manner. Res judicata is settled law
in North Carolina. The doctrine as interpreted by the courts of that
state bars any future litigation between the same parties as to all issues
which could have been raised. In diversity cases a federal court is "in
5N. C. GEN. STAT. (1943) §45-36; §1, Chap. 36, Public Laws 1933 (N. C.
Code of 1939, Michie, §2593f).
' Bullington v. Angel, 220 N. C. 18, 16 S. E. 2d 411, 136 A. L. R. 1054 (1941).
7 Bullington v. Angel, 56 F. Supp. 372 (W: D. N. C. 1944).
'Angel v. Bullington, 150 F. 2d 679 (C. C. A. 4th 1945).
'Angel v. Bullington, 326 U. S. 713, 66 Sup. Ct. 231, 90 L. Ed. 421 (1945)eAngel v. Bullington, 67 Sup. Ct. 657.
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effect, only another court of the State."'" Since res judicata is a bind-
ing sanction upon North Carolina courts, it is necessarily effective upon
federal courts sitting within that state. Thus res judicata bars the fed-
eral court from re-deciding an issue which was or could have been
decided by the state court. Therefore, since the issues before the state
court included the constitutionality of the state statute precluding an
action on a deficiency, res judicata bars the later action in the federal
court.
It should be noted that .the decision is not one resting solely upon
the principle of res judicata. Rather, as Mr. Justice Rutledge in a dis-
senting opinion aptly puts it, it is an "'and/or' hodgepodge of res
judicata and Erie doctrines.' 2  The majority opinion takes the res
judicata concept, joins it with the Erie doctrine, and the result of this
union is a half-breed, not too like either of its progenitors, whose
future interpreters may discern more resemblance to one or the other
of its antecedants.
A critical analysis of the majority view may be interesting and,
perhaps, somewhat helpful in forecasting the degree to which the Su-
preme Court may extend the Erie rule.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter begins his task with the statement that the
settled rule in North Carolina is that "an adjudication bars future liti-
gation between the same parties not only as to all issues actually raised
and decided but also as to those which could have been raised"' 3 citing
as authority therefor several North Carolina cases.' 4 Neither the North
Carolina cases cited nor none found deal with the precise type of situa-
tion here involved. Rather, they are concerned with judgments rendered
upon the "merits" of the cause. It is extremely doubtful whether North
Carolina considers that an adjudication "on the merits" results from a
refusal to exercise jurisdiction. It is the traditional view that for a
judgment to have the effect of res judicata, i.e., to be final and con-
clusive as to the issues, it must be "on the merits."' 5 The dogma is
that judgments of dismissal are not "on the merits" and do not operate
as a bar in subsequent litigation which involves the same matters. 16
"' Guaranty Trust v. York, 326 U. S. 99, 65 Sup. Ct. 1464, 89 L. Ed. 2079, 160
A. L. R. 1231 (1945).
"2Angel v. Bullington, 67 Sup. Ct. 657.at 667.
1 Id. at 659.
' Southern Distributing Company v. Carraway, 196 N. C. 58, 60, 61, 144 S. E.
535; Moore v. Harkins, 179 N. C. 167, 101 S. E. 564.
' 2 FREEMAN, JUDGMENTS 1531 (5th ed. 1925).
'a "There can be no doubt that the dismissal of an action or denial of relief
for want of jurisdiction is not a judgment on the merits, and cannot prevent the
plaintiff from subsequently prosecuting his action in any court authorized to enter-
tain and determine it." Id. at 1546. Also, "Where a valid and final personal
judgment not on the merits is rendered in favor of the defendant, the Plaintiff is
not thereby precluded from thereafter maintaining an action on the original cause
of action and the judgment is conclusive only as to what was actually decided . ..
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The Court admits that had the North Carolina action been dismissed
because it was brought in an improper North Carolina court, it could
then have been. brought in the proper North Carolina court or in a North
Carolina federal court'17 The Court is thus saying that there is no
adjudication "on the merits" when jurisdiction is refused as to some of
the state courts but that there is such an adjudication as would bar
future litigation when all state action is precluded. Why is this true in
the second case while not in the first?
It seems that the majority reasoned syllogistically that "the power
of the state to limit its jurisdiction is subject to the Constitution" ;18
the State of North Carolina has, by statute, limited its jurisdiction; the
refusal of the State court to take jurisdiction is, of itself, the adjudica-
tion of the constitutionality of the state statute, a federal question; there-
fore, this determination acts as a bar to collateral litigation. Following
this reasoning it is apparent that in the first situation, where jurisdiction
is refused as to some of the state courts, no constitutional question
has been adjudicated. On the other hand, by precluding recovery in
any or all state courts the constitutional question of power so to limit
has necessarily been litigated.19
B. Erie Rule: Erie to Angel v. Bullington.
Being satisfied that there had been an adjudication of the issue of
constitutionality of the statute by the North Carolina court, Mr. Justice
Frankfurter continues:
"For purposes of diversity jurisdiction a federal court is 'in
effect, only another court of the State.' "20
citing as authority the recent case of Guaranty Trust Co. v. York.2'
At this point a very brief outline pointing out the developments
leading to the Guaranty case should be beneficial. The demise of Swift
v. Tyson2 2 and the case overruling it, Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins,2
if a contract is valid in the State in which it is made, but in an action on the
contract in another State judgment is given for the defendant on the ground that
it is against the policy of that State to enforce the contract, this will not preclude
the plaintiff from maintaining an action on the contract in the State in which it
was made or in a third State in which the enforcement of the contract is not
against the policy of the State." RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS, §49 (1942).
"Angel v. Bullington, 67 Sup. Ct. 657 at 659.
" Id. at 660, citing McKnett v. St. Louis & S. F. R. Co., 292 U. S. 230, 233,
54 Sup. Ct. 690, 691, 78 L. Ed. 1227. "While Congress has not attempted to com-
pel States to provide courts for the enforcement of the Federal Employers' Liabil-
ity Act ... the Federal Constitution prohibits state courts of general jurisdiction
from refusing to do so solely because the suit is brought under a federal law."
" An erroneous judgment is of the same effectiveness as one which might not
be attacked upon appeal. 'Cf. Philbrook v. Newman, 148 Cal. 172, 82 Pac. 772;
Treinies v. Sunshine Mining Co., 308 U. S. 66, 60 Sup. Ct. 44, 84 L. Ed. 85 (1939).;
Note, 53 HRv. L. REV. 652 (1940).
" Angel v. Bullington, 67 Sup. Ct. 657 at 659.
21326 U. S. 99 at 108.
2.2 16 Pet. 1, 10 L. Ed. 865 (U. S. 1842).
2304 U. S. 64 (1938).
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marks the beginning of a line of decisions which progressively delimits
the freedom of the federal courts in diversity cases to apply their own
law. After the Erie decision there was no longer any "transcendental
body of law outside of any particular state, but obligatory within it
unless and until changed by statute." 24  Thereafter, federal courts in
exercising diversity jurisdiction were required, "except in matters gov-
erned by the Federal Constitution or by Acts of Congress ' 25 to apply the
law of the state.
20
Two difficulties at once arose. First, which state was to provide the
law? And second, if the proper state is determined, what law of that
state is to be applied in the federal court?
Mr. Justice Brandeis' opinion in the Erie case sheds no discernible
light on either question. It may be pointed out that as the actual result
of the Supreme Court decision the case was remanded to the federal
court sitting in New York but Pennsylvania law was to be applied. It
is not clear whether this was because the conflict of laws rule of New
York required the application of the locus delicti, i.e., that the federal
court was to apply the conflict of laws rule of the state in which it sat,
or, rather, the federal court was to apply the law of the place of the
tort without regard to the state in which it was sitting.
The federal statute27 provided:
"the laws of the several States . . . shall be regarded as rules of
decision in trials at common law in the courts of the United
States, in cases where they apply."
Surely the federal statute would lend itself to either construction.
In fact, from a purely literal and, it is thought, intelligent interpreta-
tion, the statute could well be construed to mean that the federal court
under the facts of Erie would be bound by the "general" conflict of
laws rule on the ground that litigation of a Pennsylvania tort is not
included in the phrase "in cases where they (the laws of the several
States) apply." If the New York courts, under their conflict of laws
2 Holmes dissent in Black & White Taxicab v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab, 276
U. S. 518, 532-536, 48 Sup. Ct. 404, 408-410, 72 L. Ed. 681, 686-687, 57 A. L. R.
426 (1928).
2r 304 U. S. 64 at 78. "Except in matters governed by the Federal Constitu-
tion or by acts of Congress, the law to be applied in any case is the law of the
state. And whether the law of the state shall be declared by its Legislature in a
statute or by its highest court in a decision is not a matter of federal concern.
There is no federal general common law."
20 The court remanded the case to the federal court sitting in New York where
the Pennsylvania law was applied. If this was an application by the federal court
of the conflict of laws rule of New York, it was not recognized as such. In fact,
the problem of Erie as applied to conflict of laws was not conclusively answered
until 1941 by Klaxon v. Stentor Electric Mfg. Co., 313 U. S. 487, 61 Sup. Ct. 1020,
85 L. Ed. 1477 (1941) and Griffin v. McCoach, 313 U. S. 498, 61 Sup. Ct. 1023,
85 L. Ed. 1481 (1941).
27 Rule of Decision Act, 28 U. S. C. §725, derived from §34, Federal Judiciary
Act, September 24, 1789, c. 20.
19471
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rule, would apply Pennsylvania law, the situation is no different; such
would be a coincidence having no bearing on the primary choice of law
of the federal court. However, strong as this argument may have been
if presented soon after Erie, there can be little doubf now that a federal
court must apply the law of the state in which it is sitting even though
that law should be contrary to that which is commonly accepted as being
proper.
28
The second question left open by Erie was the problem of what law
of the state must the federal court apply. Since "Congress has no
power to declare substantive rules of common law applicable in a state"
2
it should follow that the "substantive" law of the states must be applied
in the federal courts.
Characterization of a particular rule as one of substance or proce-
dure is under any circumstances difficult and somewhat inexact. It is
well nigh impossible to make a characterization which will be valid for
all purposes.3 0
The "substantive" law of the state which the Erie case, by inference
at least, required federal courts to follow was not defined or clarified
by the case itself. One must trace the term as it developed in later
-decisions. In subsequent cases the court has expanded the Erie rule so
that by the process of scrutinizing each case it is possible to determine
the present limit of the Court's characterization of "substantive" for the
purpose of diversity jurisdiction in a federal court.3'
In the same year as Erie the rule was extended to suits in equity,
though the court reserved and left unanswered a question of whether
in diversity cases the federal courts are required to follow the conflict
of laws rules prevailing in the states in which they sat where that state
did not apply the generally accepted conflict of laws rule.
32
In 1939, one year later, it was held that the rule extended to burden
of proof.3 3  Thus it was held that the federal court sitting in Texas
wrongfully declined to follow the State rule of placing the burden of
proof upon him who attacks the legal title and asserts a superior equity
in a contest concerning ownership of land.
28 Klaxon v. Stentor Electric Mfg. Co., 313 U. S. 487, 61 Sup. Ct. 1020, 85
L. Ed. 1477 (1941) ; Griffin v. McCoach, 313 U. S. 498, 61 Sup. Ct. 1023, 85 L. Ed,
1481 (1941) ; Sampson v. Channell, 110 F. 2d 754 (C. C. A. 1st 1940), 128 A. L. R.
394 (1940).
28 304 U. S. 64 at 78, " . . whether they be local in their nature or 'general,'
be they commercial law or a part of the law of torts."
20 Tunks, Categoriaztion and Federalism: "Substance" and "Procedure" After
Erie R. R. v. Tompkins, 34 ILL. L. REv. 271 (1939) ; COdK, LOGICAL. AND LEGAL
BASES OF CONFLICT OF LAWS, 154-193 (1940) ; ROBERTSON, CHARACTERIZATION IN
THE CONFLICT OF LAWS, 245-248 (1940)." Emphasis added.
2 Ruhlin v. New York Life Ins., 304 U. S. 202, 58 Sup. Ct. 860, 82 L. Ed. 1290
(1938) ; cf. supra note 26.




The next important advancement occurred in 1941 with two cases,
Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Mfg. Co.,3 4 and Griffin v. McCoach.35
In the Klaxon case the court was confronted with that problem which
it left open and unanswered in the Ruhlin case,3 viz., must a federal
court, sitting in State X, apply the conflict of laws rule of that state
when it does not conform to the "accepted" or "general" conflict of laws
rule? Speaking for a unanimous court, Mr. Justice Reed affirmatively
answered the question by saying:
"We are of the opinion that the prohibition declared in Erie
Railroad v. Tompkins . .. against such independent determina-
tions by the federal courts extends to the field of conflict of laws.
The conflict of laws rules to be applied by the federal court in
Delaware must conform to those prevailing in Delaware's state
courts. Otherwise the accident of diversity of citizenship would
constantly disturb equal administration of justice in coordinate
state and federal courts sitting side by side."
3 7
After this decision there is little chance for the success of the argu-
ment mentioned earlier, viz., that the federal court sitting in State X
need not apply the conflict of laws rule of that state since under a
plausible interpretation of Section 34 of the Federal Judiciary Act38 that
state's law would not apply.
Decided on the same day as the Klaxon case was another step in the
spreading process of the Erie doctrine, Griffin v. McCoach.39 Here an
insurance policy on the life of one Colonel Gordon had been taken out
in New York by a syndicate organized by him. Certain members of
the syndicate assigned their interests to others not connected thereto. In
an interpleader suit brought in the federal court in Texas the right of
the assignees to the proceeds was attacked on the ground that under
Texas law the beneficiaries must have an insurable interest and here the
assignees had none. The Supreme Court held that the federal court
sitting in Texas must apply the Texas law of conflict of laws and that
since the insured was a domiciliary of Texas, constitutionally Texas
could refuse to recognize rights of assignees without insurable interests
even though New York, where the transactions took place, would have
permitted the assignees to recover.
"... we are of the view that the federal courts in diversity
of citizenship cases are governed by the conflict of laws rules of
the courts of the state in which they sit. ... it is for Texas to say
whether its public policy permits a beneficiary of an insurance
policy on the life of a Texas citizen to recover where no insurable
interest in the decedent exists in the beneficiary."40
"1313 U. S. 487 (1941). " 313 U. S. 498 (1941).
"304 U. S. 202 (1938). '7313 U. S. 487, 496 (1941).
See note 27 supra. --313 U. S. 498 (1941).
,OId. at 503.
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In 1943 the Court in Palmer v. Hoffman41 rendered a decision sim-
ilar in import to Cities Service Oil Co. v. Dunlcp 42 holding that the
question of the burden of proving contributory negligence is one of local
law which a federal court in diversity of citizenship cases must apply.
The final step in the growth of the Erie doctrine before Angel v.
Bullington43 took place in 1945, Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 44 al-
ready briefly referred to. That case dealt with the duty of a federal
court sitting in New York to apply New York limitations barring
equitable relief on a cause of action arising in New York. The majority
of the court speaking through Mr. Justice Frankfurter held that the
federal court sitting in New York must apply New York limitations.
The opinion reads:
"... since a federal court adjudicating a State created right
solely because of the diversity of citizenship of the parties is for
that purpose, in effect, only another court of the State, it cannot
afford recovery if the right to recover is made unavailable by the
State nor can it substantially affect the enforcement of the right
as given by the State."45
and further that where:
"a plea of the statute of limitations would bar recovery in a State,
a federal court ought not to afford recovery."
46
It should be noted that in the Guaranty case the cause of action was
created by the same state whose statute of limitations was sought to be
applied barring recovery on the right. Thus, in the Guaranty case the
real holding is that where a State creates and limits a right, the Court
requires federal courts sitting in that State to limit the right as well.
That the State law "ought to govern in litigation founded on that
law'" 47 is not the question before the Court in Angel v. Bullington.
Lifting from its context a phrase which was applicable to the Guaranty
situation and placing it in surroundings only slightly similar may con-
ceivably lead to far reaching results. One is tempted to ask at what
point will Mr. Justice Frankfurter cease to refuse to distinguish be-
tween the State court and its alter ego.
C. Res Judicata.
Having satisfied itself that the doctrine of res judicata will bar re-
litigation of the constitutional question in the North Carolina courts
and that action in the federal courts of North Carolina is likewise pre-
'"318 U. S. 109, 63 Sup. Ct. 477, 87 L. Ed. 645, 144 A. L. R. 719 (1923).
,2308 U. S. 208 (1939).
"'Angel v. Bullington, 67 Sup. Ct. 657 (1947).
'326 U. S. 99 (1945).
4 Id. at 108-109.
4'Id. at 110.
"'Id. at 112; emphasis added.
[Vol. 26
ANGEL V. BULLINGTON
cluded, the Court, evidently troubled by the language of the North
Carolina Supreme Court48 makes a rather startling statement:
"For purposes of res judicata, the significance of what a court
says it decides is controlled by the issues that were open for
decision.
'49
Taken narrowly, this statement is undoubtedly correct. Thus, if
issue "A" is not before the court and yet the court affirmatively states
that it is deciding issue "A," this would not, on the theory of res judicata
bar a later litigation of issue "A."50
However, in the North Carolina Supreme Court case,51 the'litigation
thought to be the basis of the alleged bar of res judicata, the situation
is not that of the example above. In the opinion, the North Carolina
court there said:
"It will be noted that the limitation created by the statute is
upon the jurisdiction of the court .... The statute operates upon
the adjective law of the state, which pertains to the practice and
procedure, or legal machinery by which substantive law is made
effective, and not upon the substantive law itself. It is a limita-
tion of the jurisdiction of the courts of this state .... Both the
constitutional provision urged and the general doctrine invoked
by the appellee are substantive law and the statute involved, as
aforesaid, relates solely to the adjective law. No denial of the
full force and credit of the Virginia contract is made, and no in-
terpretation of the construction of the contract is attempted. The
court being deprived of its jurisdiction, has no power to render
a judgment for the plaintiff in the cause of action alleged.
5 2
Here, though issue "A" is before it, the court states, in effect, that
it is not deciding issue "A." Should not this situation be treated dif-
ferently? Should, under these circumstances, a prior dismissal bar a
collateral litigation of issue "A" on the theory of res judicata? That
is to say: is the quoted portion of the majority opinion true only when
a judicial body attempts to adjudicate beyond those issues open for
decision; and not where it seeks specifically to limit its decision to
something less than all the issues before it? To contend that the North\
Carolina court by expressly disclaiming decision of an issue does in
fact decide the issue may seem an unwarranted interpretation. How-
ever, the North Carolina court was of the opinion that it had no power
to grant recovery on a deficiency. It based its disability upon the North
" Bullington v. Angel, 220 N. C. 18, 16 S. E. 2d 411 (1941)." Angel v. Bullington, 67 Sup. Ct. 657, at 660.
1o2 FREEMAN, JUDGMENTS 1474 (5th ed. 1925). "But even if 'a decree, in ex-
press terms, purports to affirm a particular fact or rule of law, yet i~f such fact or
rule of law was immaterial to the issue, and the controversy did not turn upon
it, the decree will not conclude the parties in reference thereto.'"
" Bullington v. Angel, 220 N. C. 18, 16 S. E. 2d 411 (1941).
52 Id. at 20.
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Carolina statute precluding recovery on deficiencies, By its recognition
of the validity of the statute it inferentially and Qf necessity accorded
it constitutionality. This, according to Mr. Justice Frankfurter was the
issue before the state court and an issue which, notwithstanding what
the court said, was litigated and finally decided.5
3
When confronted with an argument that the North Carolina court
did not adjudicate the "merits" of the controversy, the Court said:
"It is a misconception of res judicata to assume that the doc-
trine does not come into operation if the court has not passed on
the 'merits' in the sense of ultimate substantive issues of a liti-
gation. An adjudication declining to reach such ultimate sub-
stantive issues may bar a second attempt to reach them in another
action in the State. . . . The only issue in controversy in the
first North Carolina litigation was whether or not all the courts
of North Carolina were closed to that litigation. The merits of
that issue were litigated.
'5 4
Mr. Justice Reed, in an attempt to refute this argument, proposes a
case where suit is brought in a federal court on an allegation of diver-
sity of citizenship and the federal court dismisses the suit with an
opinion saying that the case was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction,
e.g., proof of non-diversity of citizenship. It is clear, he feels, that
here, "no state court would hold that there had been a decision on the
merits."55 It is believed that there may be others, including the author
of the majority opinion, who might agree with him. Mr. Justice Reed's
hypothetical case, of course, is far from the case at bar. In his situa-
tion the dismissal by the federal court on the ground of lack of juris-
diction is only that and nothing more. The court indeed adjudicated
the issue of jurisdiction and, perhaps, as to that issue the doctrine of
res judicata is applicable., However, as a prerequisite to its arriving
at its conclusion, the federal court was not bound to make any initial
determination; whereas in the North Carolina case, before it dismissed
"' If the Court is correct in its view that the state court in deciding it had no
jurisdiction necessarily determines that the statute is constitutional, whom does
this determination bind? Are the present litigants the only parties barred from
re-litigating this question or does the state court's adjudication as interpreted by
the U. S. Supreme Court bar an action between another Virginia mortgagee of
Virginia land and a North Carolina mortgagor contesting the validity and con-
stitutionality of the statute in the courts of North Carolina or in the federal courts
sitting therein? These are problems more easily posed than solved.
" Angel v. Bullington, 67 Sup. Ct. 657 at 661.
rr Id. at 664.
" Jurisdictional facts once litigated are res judicata; (a) jurisdiction over the
person, see Baldwin v. Iowa State Traveling Men's Assn., 283 U. S. 522, 51 Sup.
Ct. 517, 75 L. Ed. 1244 (1931) ; (b) jurisdiction over the subject matter, see Stoll
v. Gottlieb, 305 U. S. 165, 59 Sup. Ct. 134, 83 L. Ed. 104 (1938) ; Treinies v. Sun-
shin Mining Co., 308 U. S. 66, 60 Sup. Ct. 44, 84 L. Ed. 85 (1939). It is sug-
gested that the scope of res judicata in the jurisdictional field extends not only' to
those jurisdictional facts which have been actually litigated but also to those which
might have been. Note, 53 HARv. L. Rav. 65Z (1940).
ANGEL V. BULLINGTON
the case, the court was forced to inquire, by inference at least, into the
constitutionality of the statute requiring dismissal.
57
D. Constitutionality of State Court's Determination.
It is quite possible that the determination of the State court was
erroneous. Under the facts, the land concerned was Virginia land, the
mortgagee a domiciliary of Virginia, the contract was made and was
to be performed in Virginia. In fact, the only contacts or interests of
North Carolina in the transaction were the fact that North Carolina
was the present domicile of the mortgagor and the state of the forum.
It would seem that according to great weight of authority, both case 58
and text writers,59 the general conflict of laws rule as to choice of law'
in a situation similar to that presented normally requires the application
either of the law governing the contract or that of the situs of the land.
Since, in the present case, the loci are identical there seems to be no
question but that the accepted rule would require the application of
Virginia law to the enforcement of the deficiency. The cases have
arrived most frequently at this result by regarding the local statute as
applicable only to local land6° or, similarly, by considering the forum
without power because of lack of real interest in the case.61
Thus the decision of the North Carolina case in the eyes of most
authorities would be the result of an improper choice of law. But, even
though erroneous, is the impropriety of such a character as to make the
operation of the local statute, under these facts, unconstitutional? To
put it differently; had Bullington sought review by the Supreme Court
of the State court's holding, might there have been a reversal?
The question of the extent of constitutional limitations upon the
choice of law is one which is not without difficulty. A discussion of
"It is not necessary to the conclusiveness of1 the former judgment-that the
issue should have been taken upon the precise point which it is proposed to con-
trovert in the collateral action. It is sufficient if that point was essential to the
former judgment. If the facts involved in the second suit are so cardinal that
without them the former decision cannot stand, they must be taken-as conclusively
settled." 2 FREEMAN, JUDGMENTS 1462 (5th ed. 1925).
" McGirl v. Brewer, 132 Ore. 422, 280 Pac. 508, 285 Pac. 208 (1930) ; Fellows
v. West, 102 Cal. 266, 32 Pac. 676 (1894) ; New York Life Ins. Co. v. Aitken, 22
Jones & S. (N. Y. 1891) ; and cases collected in 136 A. L. R. 1059.
" STUMBERG, CONFLICTS OF LAWS 351 (1937): In the event of a deficiency
remaining after foreclosure and sale, where the bond and mortgage are governed
by the same law and suit is brought in another state for the deficiency, the existence
and extent of the right to recover are determined by the law of the situs and con-
tract. Recovery will thus not be limited by provisions of the internal law of the
forum prohibiting deficiency judgments, or restricting recovery to the difference
between the debt and the true value of the land, rather than the amount realized
on sale." GOODRICH, CO NFLIc OF LAws 402 (2d ed. 1938).
'0 Fidelity Bankers Trust v. Little, 178 S. C. 133, 181 S. E. 913 (1935) ; McGirl
v. Brewer, 132 Ore. 422, 280 Pac. 508, 285 Pac. 208 (1930).
"1Connecticut Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Conley, 194 Minn. 41, 259 N. W. 390
(1935) (holding that a conditional statute of Minnesota did not apply to an Iowa
note on Iowa land. "It is obvious that the legislature of this state has no power
to enact laws with respect to Iowa contracts and Io.wa real estate mortgages.").
1947]
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the problem has been a favorite of those who profess facility in writing
on the law. 2  Since it is not the purpose of this paper to rewarm past
delicacies, only a very perfunctory outline of the problem will be
presented.
Among the most important constitutional sanctions which may cause
a state to make a particular choice of law, or which may effect a reversal
by the Supreme Court if a mistaken choice is made, are full faith and
credit,6 3 due process, 64 interstate commerce,6 5 impairment of the obliga-
tion of a contract,"6 and privileges and immunities. 7 Of these, the first
two have been more frequently before the Supreme Court. Generally,
the Court has not seen fit to voice its disapproval of the state court's
determination of governing law save in cases falling within three general
classifications, viz., insurance, including fraternal beneficial associations,
shareholder's liability suits and workmen's compensation. 8
In fact, in Kryger v. Wilson69 one of the earlier decisions, not of
the above listed types but a case dealing with title to lhnd in another
state, Mr. Justice Brandeis said, regarding an alleged misapplication
of the law:
"The most that the plaintiff in error can say is that the State
court made a mistaken application of doctrines of the conflict of
laws in deciding that the cancellation of the land contract is gov-
erned by the law of the situs instead of the place of making and
performance. But that, being purely a question of local common
law, is a matter with which this court is not concerned." 70
Subsequent to the Kryger decision the Supreme Court faced a series
of cases of alleged misapplication of "accepted" conflict of laws rules.
It is extremely difficult to attain any order out of the chaos of these
Supreme Court opinions. Ranging from a requirement that the state
must recognize the statute of a sister state,71 to an almost total absence
'2 Dodd, The Power of the Supreme Court to Review State Decisions in the
Field of Conflict of Laws, 39 H~av. L. REv. 533 (1926) ; Hilbert and Cooley, The
Federal Cmtitution and Choice of Law, 25 WASH. U. L. Q. 27 (1939); Ross,
Has Conflict of Laws Become a Branch of Constitutional Laws?, 15 MINN. L. REv.
161 (1931); Ross, Full Faith and Credit in a Federal System, 20 MINN. L. REv.
140 (1931) ; Smith, The Constitution and Conflict of Laws, 27 Gzo. L. J. 536
(1939) ; Overton, State Decisions in Conflict of Laws and Review by the United
States Supreme Court Under the Due Process Clause, 22 ORE. L. REV. 109 (1943).
" U. S. CoNsT. Art. IV, §1. e'U. S. CoNsT. AmEND. 14, §1.
" U. S. CONST. Art. 1, §8. U. S. CONST. Art. 1, §10.
U. S. CoisT. AmEND. 14, §1.
° Cf. Alaska Packers Assoc. v. Industrial Accident Comm. of California, 294
U. S. 532, 55 Sup. Ct. 518, 79 L. Ed. 1044 (1935) ; Pacific Employers Insurance
Co. v. Industrial Accident Commission, 306 U. S. 493, 59 Sup. Ct. 629, 83 L. Ed.
940 (1939) ; Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 320 U. S. 430, 64 Sup. Ct. 208, 88
L. Ed. 149, 150 A. L. R. 413 (1943).
09242 U. S. 171, 37 Sup. Ct. 34, 61 L. Ed. 229 (1916).
o Id. at 176, 37 Sup. Ct. at 35, 61 L. Ed. at 232.
John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Yates, 299 U. S. 178, 57 Sup. Ct. 129,
81 L. Ed. 106 (1936).
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of restriction upon the state,72 the Supreme Court decisions apparently
"bracketed" the difficulty. Today, if test there be, it is most analogous
to that delineating the power of a state to taxY3 That is to say, if there
is control, if there is protection, if there are sufficient governmental
interests to give foundation to the application of the law of a particular
jurisdiction, the Supreme Court will not disturb a decision of the state
court on the ground that there has been a violation of the full faith and
credit clause or a denial of due process because of misapplication of
law.74
Since absolutes in a realm of relatives are elusive if not non-existent,
it is hazardous to guess what the result of Bullington's appeal to the
Supreme Court might have been.
It is possible, though, it is suspected, unlikely that the application
of its statute by the North Carolina court in this situation would be
found to be unconstitutional upon review by the Supreme Court as a
violation of the 14th Amendment or of Art. IV, section 1. If so, then
Bullington would be free to bring his action in any court, federal or
state, including those of North Carolina.
However, upon review the statute may be found to be constitutional.
Such a decision may rest upon one of two grounds: that it is constitu-
tional even though it precludes substantive as well as procedural rights,
or, that the statute operated only upon the adjective or procedural law
of the state and was therefore constitutional.
If the position of the Cout were the former, the plaintiff would
have no standing in the federal court in North Carolina by reason of
the acknowledged Erie doctrine requiring the application of the sub-
stantive law of the state in the federal court sitting therein.
If the view of the Court were the latter, that the statute merely was
procedural, the dismissal in the state court was then not an adjudication
on "the merits" and Bullington would not be barred from bringing
action in another court. However, his chances of success in the federal
court sitting in North Carolina are meager. "That chance was hardly
worth the gamble," writes Mr. Justice Rutledge in his dissent,715 for the
rule of Guaranty Trust v. York 70 would seem to bar an action in a fed-
eral court where no recovery is possible in the state court. Though the
1 Pink v. A. A. A. Highway Express, 314 U. S. 201, 62 Sup. Ct. 241, 86 L. Ed.
152 (1941).
71 Cf. Curry v. McCanless, 307 U. S. 357, 59 Sup. Ct. 900, 83 L. Ed. 1339, 123
A. L. R. 162 (1939) ; Graves v.. Elliott, 307 U. S. 383, 59 Sup. Ct. 913, 83 L. Ed.1356 (1939).
7' Hoopeston Canning Co. v. Cullen, 318 U. S. 313, 63 Sup. Ct. 602, 87 L. Ed.
777 (1943) ; Pacific Employers Insurance Co. v. Industrial Accident Commission,
306 U. S. 493, 59 Sup. Ct. 629, 83 L. Ed. 940 (1939). But cf., recent majority
opinion of Mr. Justice BurtOn in Order of United Commercial Travelers of
America v. Wolfe, 67 Sup. Ct. 1355 (1947).
"Angel v. Bullington, 67 Sup. Ct. 657 at 670.70326 U. S. 99 (1945).
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York case is not precisely in point, yet its theory could readily be ex-
panded to include the circumstances of the present case.
77
E. Construction and Effect of State Statute and Policy,
The Court by a three-pointed argument seeks to negative the sug-
gestion that the North Carolina Supreme Court construed the statute
in such a way as to close only the state courts but not the federal court
sitting in North Carolina. First, Mr. Justice Frankfurter denies that
the state court made any such assertion, saying, "It construed the statute
expressive of State policy and spoke only of the jurisdiction of the
State courts because it was concerned only with the State courts."
78
The opinion of the Supreme Court of North Carolina79 in dealing with
the limitation of the statute reads in part: "This closes the courts of this
State to one who seeks a deficiency judgment on a note given for the
purchase price of real property. The statute operates upon the adjective
law of the State.... It is a limitation of the jurisdiction of the courts
of this State."8 0 Mr. Justice Frankfurter manifestly is not swayed by
the equivocal Latin maxim, "Inclusio unius est exclusio alterius." One
is induced to ask what view would have been taken by the learned jus-
tice had the North Carolina court specifically construed tht statute as
closing all courts in North Carolina, expressly stating that action in the
federal courts was precluded as well.
Secondly, and with little more rationality, the court declares, "... it
is most incongruous to attribute to the legislature and judiciary of
North Carolina the imposition of a restriction against all its citizens
from suing for a deficiency judgment, while impliedly authorizing citi-
zens of other states to secure such deficiency judgments against North
Carolinians."81  It may be admitted that there is slight probability that
the legislature or judiciary of North Carolina desires to restrict its own
citizens but not those of other states. However, it is suggested that,
despite that, there would be here no greater discrimination than that
which normally results from local statutes which limit or bar a right
of action, or from any local decision wherein the court refuses to exer-
cise its jurisdiction 8 2 To take'the view proposed would result in grant-
"In point of fact, the York -case was thought by Mr. Justice Rutledge to have
been an alternate basis for the majority view.
"Angel v. Bullington, 67 Sup. Ct. 657 at 662. Cf. his earlier statement, "For
purposes of res judicata, the significance of what a court says it decides is con-
trolled by the issues that were open for decision." On the face of it, these two
statements seem in opposition.
" Bullington v. Angel, 220 N. C. 18, 16 S. 'E. 2d 411 (1941).80Id. at 20, 16 S. E. 2d at 412.
" Angel v. Bullington, 67 Sup. Ct. 657 at 662.
" Chambers v. Baltimore & 0. R. R., 207 U. S. 142, 28 Sup. Ct. 34, 52 L. Ed.
143 (1907). But note qualifications upon limiting of jurisdiction. McKnett v. St.
Louis & S. F. R. R., 292 U. S. 230, 54 Sup. Ct. 690, 78 L. Ed. 1227 (1934) ; Sioux
Remedy Co. v. Cope, 235 U. S. 197, 35 Sup. Ct 57, 59 L Ed 193 (1914). The
operation of the doctrine of forum non convenien is a familiar example of the
problem presented here.
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ing exterritorial effect to local policy. Here, it is believed, North Caro-
lina is simply asserting that the holder of notes securing the purchase
price of land shall not be entitled to recovery in the courts of North
Carolina. Surely the court would not go to the extreme of holding that
an action brought against Angel in the courts of another state should
be barred by the policy of his domicile as expressed by its statute. More-
over, there was no perceivable reason for the court to insert this argu-
ment since, by the simple expedient of declaring that, "For purposes of
diversity jurisdiction a federal court is 'in effect, only another court
of the State,' ,3 any criticism of the Supreme Court's explication of
what the North Carolina court meant is futile. However, as a result of
that declaration, the court in essence admits of the power of a state,
through its legislature and judiciary, to limit or take away the juris-
diction of the federal court in diversity cases.
Thirdly, the Court argues that the statute, upheld by the North
Carolina court, is expressive of North Carolina policy and that it is the
duty of the federal court to carry out that policy under the Erie doctrine.
"The essence of diversity jurisdiction is that a federal court enforces
State law and State policy. . . . A federal court in North Carolina,
when invoked on grounds of diversity of citizenship, cannot give that
which North Carolina has withheld."
8 4
If this be true for the present case, how far will the doctrine be
carried? Assume that Angel brought action against Bullington in
North Carolina for specific performance of a contract to convey Vir-
ginia land. Assume further that a North Carolina statute contained a
limitation upon the court in that it declared that no person shall be en-
titled to a decree of specific performance of a contract to convey foreign
land. Would a determination of the North Carolina Supreme Court
that the statute barred Angel's action in the state court likewise preclude
it in a federal court of North Carolina? It would seem that no recovery
could be had since the same factors were present: the statute limiting
the state court's jurisdiction and the determination in the state court
upholding the statute as to the same parties.
What would be the result if the plaintiff seeks a remedy in the fed-
eral court without first going to the state court, there having been
decisions of the state court upholding the constitutionality of the statute
in similar cases? Would the absence of the state court determination
as applied to the plaintiff cause a different conclusion? Or, as a further
step, assuming that the constitutionality of the statute has never been
questioned and therefore never determined, would the federal court
apply the policy of the state as announced by the legislature of North
Carolina and refuse recovery?
"Guaranty Trust v. York, 326 U. S. 99 (1945)."Angel v. Bullington, 67 Sup. Ct. 657 at 662.
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It is, of course, apparent that the principal case is not square author-
ity for an affirmative answer to this question. 'However, the language
of the majority opinion would seem to be broad enough to require the
federal court to conform to state policy even though there be nothing
more than the bare statute indicative of it. Whether the Court will
extend the Erie rule to cover this remains yet to be answered.
That the Supreme Court would require conformity with a state
statute of doubtful constitutionality, as the one in question, is improb-
able. Judge Magruder, speaking for the Circuit Court of Appeals for
the First Circuit, dealt with this problem indirectly in Sampson v. Chan-
nell.8 5  Concerning whether or not a federal court must follow an
unconstitutional state decision, it was said:
"Presumably we are permitted under the Tompkins case thus
to attack the decision of a state court collaterally, so to speak, for
the Supreme Court would hardly require the federal courts to
follow a local decision which, had it been appealed, vould have
been reversed by the Supreme Court on constitutional grounds."8
It would seem that if this dictum is accurate, a federal court would
have even less reason to apply a state statute of probable unconstitu-
tionality.
F. Object and Purpose of Diversity Jurisdiction.
The majority then advances the object of diversity jurisdiction,
saying:
"Availability of diversity jurisdiction which was put in the
Constitution so as to prevent discrimination against outsiders is
not to effect discrimination against the great local body of local
citizens."8 7
Without question, protection against discrimination of non-residents
was the major purpose of diversity jurisdiction of federal courts. But
in what manner is diversity jurisdiction being used to discriminate
against "the great body of local citizens ?" True, if a contrary view be
'taken, a resident of North Carolina may not recover on a deficiency
against another resident of North Carolina in a state court. Nor, since
there is no diversity of citizenship, may he recover in a federal court.
88
And a non-resident bringing action in a state court against a resident
may not recover, yet he may in the federal court. Still it should be
emphasized, a resident who could not recover against a non-resident in
the state court would have resort to the federal court for relief. Accord-
" 110 F. 2d 754 (C. C. A. 1st 1940), cert. denied, 310 U. S. 650, 60 Sup.
Ct. 1099, 85 L. Ed. 1415 (1940). See also Griffin v. McCoach, 313 U. S. 498,
61 Sup. Ct. 1023, 85 L. Ed. 1481 (1941).
80Id. at 759.
87Angel v. Bullington, 67 Sup. Ct. 657 at 662.
88 Unless, of course, a federal right is claimed.
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ingly, it would appear that the court's complaint of discrimination is
less weighty than at first glance.
Furthermore, against the proposition of discrimination must be bal-
anced the possibility of fraud, or, at the least, a likelihood of unfairness.
Is it not probable that a resident of North Carolina may enter into a
contract in Virginia knowing full well that the policy of his domicile,
North Carolina, will not permit recovery thereon? Where service in
Virginia is not feasible this is a real danger and one to which the parties
may now be exnnsed.
8 9
IV. GRouNDs OF DECIsION
A. Erie and/or res judicata.
Mr. Justice Rutledge in a critical dissent decries the joining of 'both
res judicata and Erie as an unnecessary admixture which "distorts and
misapplies both doctrines." This invites an investigation into the ques-
tion of whether or not there was a necessity for their joint use.
Had the Court used as a basis for its decision the Erie doctrine
alone, two roads would have been open. The Court could have held,
against the contention of Bullington, that the state court's construction
of state policy was not a violation of the Constitution. The opinion,
then, would have been similar to that of Griffin v. McCoach" and the
case would have been remanded to the district court to apply the state
policy and statute. On the other hand, the Court could, and here did,
refmue to determine the constitutional question in the first instance.
Unquestionably, there is some doubt as to the constitutionality of the
state act as applied to a non-resident plaintiff suing on a contract deal-
ing with foreign land. Therefore, constitutionality not being predeter-
mined, the district court must resolve for itself the constitutional
question inasmuch as a federal court, it is believed, would have no duty
to apply an erroneous and unconstitutional state law.0 1 This determina-
tion would then be subject to review by the Supreme Court. Thus it
would appear that, since the Court refused to determine constitutionality
" "It is considered more important in the administration of justice in our fed-
'eral system to prevent a party from taking advantage of the accident of diversity
of citizenship to secure the benefits of a more favorable rule of law than to pre-
vent him from taking a like advantage of his own immunity from service of
process or his opponent's liability to such service because of the accident of
locality." Morgan, Choice of Law Governing Proof, 58 HARv. L. REv. 153,. 189
(1944).
so313 U. S. 498, 61 Sup. Ct. 1023, 85 L. Ed. 1481 (1941). The Court decided
the constitutionality of the state policy in the first instance before remanding the
case to the district court. The Court said, "If upon examination of the Texas law
it appears that the courts of Texas would refuse enforcement of an insurance
contract where the beneficiaries have no insurable interest on the ground of its
interference with the local law, such refusal would be, in our opinion, within the
constitutional power of Texas courts.""i Note dictum in Sampson v. Channell. supra note 85.
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initially, the use of Erie alone as a foundation for the decision would
open the door for a Supreme Court "encore."
Might the decision have been grounded solely on res judicata? A
judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction would bar a collateral
action between the same parties on the same issues in the absence of
;fraud.9 2  In order to give effect to the North Carolina action as res
judicata it must be assumed that the majority was correct :n its inter-
pretation of the North Carolina decision and what it actually adjudicated,
viz., the constitutional validity of the statute as applied in these circum-
stances.9 3  Assuming, therefore, a valid judgment on the "merits" of a
court of competent jurisdiction, if, rather than bringing suit in the fed-
eral court, Bullington had brought the second action in the courts of a
sister state, Angel might have pleaded as a bar the prior North Carolina
judgment on the grounds of "full faith and credit."0 4 But "full faith
and credit" only constrains the forum to give to the foreign judgment
that effect and meaning which it would have been given in the state
rendering the judgment.95 The effect and meaning of the North Caro-
lina decision, as obviously understood by the North Carolina court, was
that the North Carolina statute "is a limitation of the jurisdiction of
the courts of this State," that Bullington was not entitled to recovery
"in such courts." "The court, being deprived of its jurisdiction, has no
power to render judgment for the plaintiff in the cause of action
alleged."9 6 Therefore the sister state, in conformity with the require-
ments of "full faith and credit" would merely be required to recognize
the inability of the North Carolina court to exercise jurisdiction. Such
recognition would satisfy the constitutional requirement but would not
bar action at the forum0 7 Nor should the "full faith and credit" clause
preclude an action on the sister state's judgment in the federal court
sitting in North Carolina 8 since "the courts of the United States are
bound to give to the judgments of the state courts the same faith and
credit that the courts of one state are bound to give to judgments of the
courts of her sister states."' 9
" See note 56 supra.
" See note 57 supra.
", U. S. CONsT. Art. IV, §1. The same rules relative to the requirement of
an adjudication "on the merits" apply to "full faith and credit" as to res judicata.
Or 28 U. S. C. A. §687. ". .. and the said records and judicial proceedings, so
authenticated shall have such faith and credit given to them in every court within
the United States as they have by law or usage in the courts of the State from
which they were taken."
90Bullington v. Angel, 220 N. C. 18, 20, 16 S. E. 2d 411, 412 (1941).
9 7Warner v. Buffalo Drydock Co., 67 F. 2d 540 (C. C. A. 2d 1933); cf. In-
dustrial Commission of Wisconsin v. McCartin, 67 Sup. Ct. 886 (1947).
"Judgments of* state courts are accorded full faith and credit in the federal
courts. American Surety Co. v. Baldwin, 287 U. S. 156, 53 Sup. Ct. 98, 77 L. Ed.
231, 86 A. L. R. 298 (1932).
" Cooper v. Newell, 173 U. S. 555, 567, 19 Sup. Ct. 506, 510, 43 L. Ed. 808,
812 (1899).
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As long as the North Carolina federal court was considered a sep-
arate entity for all purposes Mr. Justice Frankfurter was faced with the
probable ineffectiveness of the res judicata concept as applied to the
facts of this case. It is possibly for that reason that phraseology of the
York development of the Erie doctrine was introduced. If in diversity
cases a federal court is "in effect only another court of the State," the
res judicata doctrine then becomes a fully adequate impediment to fur-
ther litigation in the federal court.
B. Rationale.
Unquestionably, the .court has gone to great lengths to preclude a
recovery for Bullington in the federal court of North Carolina. Its
motives are not readily distinguishable. Howecer, there are several bases
upon which the decision may be rationalized.
It may be merely that the Court is applying in another instance the
fundamental principle of Erie, namely, the procurement of the same
result in both federal court and the courts of the state in which it sits.1' °
Statewide uniformity is regarded as more of a desideratum than uni-
formity between the states. This aim is considered so paramount that
characterization by the state of a matter as procedural or substantive
will not control the federal court sitting therein when conformity of
result will be sacrificed.10 1
The desired conformity, however, would have been attained without
the intrusion of res judicata. The rationale, therefore, must be Erie
and more. Perhaps it is a desire to put an end to litigation, for as
brought out before, the result of refusal to determine the constitutional
question while grounding the decision solely on Erie would readily have
led to a return of the case to the Supreme Court.10 2 The importation
of res judicata averts that additional litigation.
A contributing factor may well be the evident inclination of the Court
.to lessen the quantity of cases coming to the federal courts on diversity
grounds alone.
"That the justices have exhibited tendencies in the past to
reduce the number of cases coming into federal courts solely on
diversity grounds is common currency. Conformable 'substance,'
with 'substance' roughly defined to include all matters likely to
bear vitally on the result in a case is one way of reducing the
number of these cases. If the 'law' is the same, probably the
greatest single impetus behind the march to the federal court
rooms solely on diversity grounds has been removed."' 03
.00 Griffin v. McCoach, 313 U. S. 498 (1941); Klaxon v. Stentor Electric Mfg
Co., 313 U. S. 487 (1941)."01 Guaranty Trust Co. v. York. 326 U. S. 99 (1945).
"'2Supra pp. 45-46.
'0' TUNKS, op. cit. supra note 30, at 302.
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V. POSSIBLE EFFECT OF ANGEL V. BULLINGTON
The effect and possible consequences of the present decision solicit
examination and exploration. Though it is never ascertainable what
complexion a future litigation may put on an earlier decision, a pro-
jection of the principal case may be of some value. In order to specu-
late upon the prospective development of Angel v. Bullington several
hypothetical situations are presented.
First-Where the plaintiff brought initial action against the de-
fendant in the federal court of North Carolina, prior to
any state interpretation of the statute.
It is probable here that the plaintiff would have procured an unassailable
judgment. It is likely that, in this case, the federal court would have
construed the statute as covering deficiencies concerning North Carolina
property only.104 And it is not probable that the Supreme Court would
have disturbed this construction, at least, as here, where there was no
prior state interpretation of the statute. One may have some misgiving
as to whether or not the federal court would be compelled by "full
faith and credit" or an Erie-conscious Court to give effect to the statute
of North Carolina. As briefly noted supra,05 the constitutional sanction
presumably will not be of a character which would force the federal
court in North Carolina to accord to the statute any effect other than
that given it in North Carolina, viz., to preclude jurisdiction of a North
Carolina state court. Conversely, however, it is not difficult to imagine
that the court would find that the vigorous Erie rule requires a result
in conformity with the local formula. 10
6
Second-Where, after the North Carolina state action, plaintiff
was able to serve the defendant in Virgina and brought
action in a Virginia state court.
It is very likely that recovery would be possible.AD Since the North
Carolina decision was, as construed by the North Carolina court itself,
merely a dismissal for want of jurisdiction, "full faith and credit" would
not require a dismissal in the Virginia state court. Presumably this
result would not be limited only to Virginia but to both state and fed-
eral courts of any sister state other than North Carolina.
Third-Where the plaintiff brought the initial suit and obtained
judgment in Virginia.
Under these circumstances there can be little doubt but that the plaintiff
would recover upon a suit on the Virginia judgment even though the
104 McGirl v. Brewer, 132 Ore. 422, 280 Pac. 508, 285 Pac. 208 (1930).10 Supra, pp. 45-46.
.0o Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U. S. 99 (1945).
.07 Warner v. Buffalo Drydock, 67 F. 2d 540 (C. C. A. 2d 1933).
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suit be brought in North Carolina.-08  North Carolina would ordinarily
be required by "full faith and credit" to recognize the Virginia judg-
ment as long as North Carolina had a suitable court in which action
on the judgment might be brought.'0 9 Furthermore, recovery could be
had in the North Carolina federal court as well, since the federal courts
are bound by "full faith and credit" to the same extent as a state
court."l0
Fourth-Where, after the litigation in both the North Carolina
state court and the North Carolina federal court and
the reversal by the United States Supreme Court, plain-
tiff brought action in Virginia.
If it be true that the reasons for reversal of the lower federal courts
was that the North Carolina federal court was only another court of
that state, it might be argued that the result should be the same as that
arrived at in the second hypothesis supra. That is to say, though the
state court necessarily determined the constitutionality of the state stat-
ute and this bound the federal court sitting in North Carolina to refuse
recovery, the vital question, ie., the liability of Angel to Bullington,
was not concluded. Therefore, action may be brought, assuming proper
service be had, and recovery enjoyed in the state courts of any sister
state. Furthermore, it would seem that this analysis, buttressed by the
York rule of state court-federal court identity,"' should permit recov-
ery by the plaintiff in any federal court other than that sitting in North
Carolina.
If the preceding discussion be a true explanation of the meaning
and effect of Angel v. Bullington it would appear that the two under-
lying principles of the res judicata concept are not consummated." 2
Neither is the defendant protected from vexatious relitigation nor is the
public interest in termination of litigation subserved.
VI. CONCLUSION
The major consequence of the Supreme Court decision ostensibly
208 Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U. S. 230, 28 Sup. Ct. 641, 52 L. Ed. 1039 (1908).
'0' Though it has been held that the Constitution does not require a state to
provide a court, Anglo-American Provision Co. v. Davis Provision Co., 191 U. S.
373, 24 Sup. Ct. 92, 48 L. Ed. 225 (1903), yet a state may not avoid its obliga-
tions of full faith and credit by simply denying to otherwise competent courts
jurisdiction to entertain suits on judgments,.Kenney v. Supreme Lodge, 252 U. S.
411, 40 Sup. Ct. 371, 64 L. Ed. 638, 10 A. L. R. 716 (1920), nor may the state
substantially deny jurisdiction by requiring conditions legally impossible of ful-
fillment, Broderick v. Rosner, 294 U. S. 629, 55 Sup. Ct. 589, 79 L. Ed. 1100,
100 A. L. R. 1133 (1935). Note language of the North Carolina statute, op. cit.
supra note 5, ". . . or where a judgment or decree is given . . ." the person ".
shall not be entitled to a deficiency judgment."
0 American Surety Co. v. Baldwin, 287 U. S. 156 (1932).
... Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U. S. 99 (.1945).
...Von Mosckzisher, Res Judicata, 38 YALE L. J. 299 (1929); 2 FREEMAN,
JuDGmENTs 1318 (5th ed. 1925).
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
is the somewhat shocking result that a state legislature may, in effect,
limit, expand or eliminate the diversity jurisdiction of a federal court
within that state.113 Though the case is not authority for a rule to the
effect that a state statute alone may qualify the jurisdiction of a federal
court, yet the majority opinion categorically declares obsolete 14 an earlier
case"z5 which promulgated the doctrine that:
"The state could not prescribe the qualifications of suitors in
the courts of the United States and could not deprive of their
privileges those who were entitled under the Constitution and
laws of the United States to resort to the Federal courts for th
enforcement of a valid contract.""16
The Eric policy of conformity continues to expand and to gather
within its compass a growing assembly. The future inviolability of the
jurisdiction of the federal courts is obscure and precarious. The pres-
ent fascination of the Court for statewide uniformity and the momentum
of the engulfing Erie doctrine may be of such potency as to lead to even
further encroachment of this hitherto sacrosanct field.
... It may be argued with not too great hope of success that the jurisdiction
of the federal court is not abridged by the North Carolina legislature and judiciary
but rather that the inaction of the plaintiff, himself, by failing to bring his action
originally in the federal court or by failing to seek review of the State decision
in the United States Supreme Court, is an instance of not seasonably taking ad-
vantage of the jurisdiction which existed.
"' "In so far as [the case] is based on a view of diversity jurisdiction which
came to an end with Erie R. R. v. Tomkins."
... David Lupton's Sons v. Auto Club of America, 225 U. S. 489, 32 Sup Ct.
711, 56 L. Ed. 1177, Ann. Cas. 1914A, 699 (1912).
I" Id. at 500, 32 Sup. Ct. 711 at 714. State law is given effect through the
Rule of Decision Act, 28 U. S. Code §725, derived from §34 of the Judiciary Act
of 1789, ch. 20, which provides, "The laws of the several states, except where she
Constitution, treaties, or statutes of the United States otherzese require or provide,
shall be regarded as rules of decision in trials at common law, in the courts of
the United States, in cases where they apply." Quaere: Is the rule of Angel v.
Bullington only applicable where the state law does not conflict specifically with the
criteria of federal jurisdiction as set forth in the Judicial Code?
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